Northern Ghana is not on fire, not now. This reality has prompted successive administrations to perceive the Sahel threat primarily as an issue pertaining to Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and, at most, Benin. This comfort harbors peril especially when one looks at the map of West Africa. In the context of Mali, the Malian junta governs less than fifty percent of the nation’s territory.
Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), the coalition affiliated with al-Qaeda, exerts control over this area of the Sahel and even besieged Bamako in 2025. The military juntas in the Sahel have consistently referenced the inability of civilian administrations to manage jihadist insurgency as a rationale for their coups. What measures do they plan to implement to restrain the jihadists?
They have sought security collaboration with Russia’s Africa Corps following the expulsion of French troops. Nonetheless, the outcomes remain unchanged. Notwithstanding the occurrence of this external involvement, the territory governed by jihadists in the Sahel has expanded since the coups and the Africa Corps have been associated with heinous acts against civilians, like the Moura massacre in Mali.
The core structural issue remains
unresolved. The mercenary troops provide regime safeguarding, resource exploitation, and do not ensure public safety. In exchange, these entities receive mining concessions as compensation for their assistance. Consequently, a cycle of financial motivation fostering instability instead of security and stability is established and sustained.
Thus, the juntas have traded imperfect democratic accountability for a security partnership lacking any accountability, leading to a marked increase in terrorism. Analysts monitoring this region indicate a calculated advance southward into Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and northern Ghana by various factions aiming for the Atlantic coastline.
At Nyansa Institute, we believe in the capacity of Africans to meet difficulties head-on and provide homegrown answers to the numerous issues facing the continent, rather than relying on ineffective foreign interventions as seen in the Sahel region. In addressing the Sahel danger, we assert that Ghana should take the lead and do it with determination.
Credit is Due but Motion is not Progress
Ghana deserves recognition for not remaining fully inactive in combating the threat from the Sahel. The nation has hosted the Accra Initiative, an agreement between Benin, Burkina Faso, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire. This security coalition has resulted in numerous apprehensions through collaborative operations, intelligence exchange, and a permanent secretariat located in Accra.
More so, A $40 million Coastal States Stability Mechanism, supported by the US and Germany, alongside a domestic BORDER Project, is specifically designed to provide security in the north. Although none of these actions should be disregarded, they must not be misconstrued as sufficient to address the magnitude of the problem.
Decisive Action and Leadership Required
Ghana should be decisive as a regional leader and refrain from delaying essential tasks that are crucial for countering the threat. Such tasks include urgent intervention in managing counter-terrorism finance, addressing issues of governance at its peripheries, and cooperation with the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
The financing of counter-terrorism should not be considered a mere afterthought. A report from a UN delegation to the North East and Upper East areas of Ghana should keep the government officials awake. The report claims that authorities comprehend the danger we face thoroughly, but are severely lacking in equipment, training, and legal jurisdiction to take meaningful action. For instance, both fertilizer and fuel have found use in improvised explosives, but their transit within these areas occurs with minimum tracking.
The government ought not to regard our northern border as a security issue but rather a governance gap. The scholarly discourse regarding the proliferation of insurgency highlights the significant lack of state involvement in delivering services, resolving disputes, and offering economic prospects in such peripheral territories, while its sporadic military presence undermines its credibility and claims to authority. This phenomenon has been noted in Mali, where jihadists impose taxes and govern such territories.
The government ought to interact with the AES juntas devoid of emotional bias. Fortunately, the present administration’s communication with Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey is a positive step. Disregarding the existence of governments with genuine geographical authority is not a viable counter-terrorism strategy. Nonetheless, the appearance of discussions lacking actionable agreements and genuine collaborative intelligence exchanges is simply diplomatic performance.
The Window Is Not Permanent
The timeframe for Ghana to lead against the threat is definite. Benin treated the cautionary indicators as insignificant background noise, and we are not oblivious to the repercussions. A substantial commitment to our northern border communities, the creation of a swift response mechanism via the Accra Initiative, and the rectification of the terrorism financing loopholes highlighted by UNODC must be carried out without fail. The future of Ghana will be determined more by the operational efficacy of the existing institutions such as the Accra Initiative, the BORDER Project, and the AES channel it has engaged, including their funding and staffing, rather than by any singular, momentous decision. The threat from the Sahel is not theoretical. It is several hundred kilometers to the south. Nonetheless, Ghana has several advantages—democratic frameworks, institutions, and soft power—that should be leveraged to counter the onslaught initiated by the extremists. It owes this to its own survival and to those who look up to Nkrumah’s black star as a guiding figure.
Samuel Koranteng Adjei (Executive Director)
THE NYANSA INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
The Nyansa Institute for Strategic Dialogue is a Ghanaian think tank dedicated to creating structured, evidence-based spaces for dialogue on governance, economic development, security, leadership, and regional integration.
Source: www.thenewindependentonline.com
