News Desk Report
The Liptako-Gourma Charter, signed in September 2023 as a mutual defence pact between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to provide collective security against terrorism and armed groups, took on a new form in January 2025 when these three frontier Sahelian states walked out of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
The Charter has evolved into the Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des Etats du Sahel) and commands political and economic authority in the Sahel region. The walkaway, whilst celebrated in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey, was unwelcomed in the corridors of the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja. An event of greater magnitude than a political disagreement transpired: the regional organisation experienced a loss of 54 percent of its geographical area, 17 percent of its inhabitants, and its entire northern border within a single day.
How has the withdrawal impacted ECOWAS?
Considering the fifty-year experiment of the regional block, this development has the semblance of an obituary, but it is not. Nonetheless, it would be misleading to claim that ECOWAS came out of this rift unscathed.
The crucial question for all citizens, traders, students, and policymakers in the remaining twelve member nations is not whether ECOWAS has been harmed. It manifestly has, but how bad is it? In terms of land area, the three seceding states comprised 54 percent of the whole expanse of ECOWAS. The regional block now oversees a coastal and island community that has entirely relinquished its continental interior frontier — a geographic dismemberment that has immediate repercussions for the regional security structure.
The withdrawal has also revealed the limitations of ECOWAS’s enforcement capabilities. The promise of military involvement in response to the 2023 Niger coup was ultimately unfulfilled, demonstrating the structural difficulties of collective action amidst discord among member states.
Moreover, the withdrawal substantiated the AES argument that ECOWAS enforces democratic governance criteria inconsistently, penalising military regimes while permitting constitutional alterations by elected officials, such as in Togo and other countries. This viewpoint has extended beyond the three exiting states, since Afrobarometer data indicates that 54 percent of Togolese now favour AES alignment.
Furthermore, the interruption of trade routes and the loss of access to landlocked markets have caused economic friction; yet ECOWAS pragmatically preserved the Trade Liberalisation Scheme and visa-free mobility for AES citizens to retain functional relationships. In terms of geopolitics, the withdrawal has expedited a multipolar shift where Russia and China are seizing the power gap that ECOWAS and its Western partners have abandoned.
How can we continue to strengthen regional integration while protecting against the spread of military coups and undemocratic rule?
The most enduring accomplishment of ECOWAS is not its democratic frameworks or its peacekeeping initiatives. It is a more commonplace yet significant reality: a Ghanaian trader can do business in Togo, a Senegalese student can pursue education in Nigeria, and a Sierra Leonean employee can search for work in Côte d’Ivoire without the necessity of a visa. This structure remains intact.
Despite the exit of AES, ECOWAS intentionally maintained the economic ties: goods and services from the three Sahel nations are still governed by the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme, and their nationals continue to enjoy visa-free travel within member countries until further notice. This pragmatism lends to further the course of regional integration.
It is significant to mention that the Sahel countries would not be sanctioned back into ECOWAS.
Nevertheless, their landlocked geography necessitates access to ECOWAS ports as an economic requirement rather than a diplomatic favour. The coastal state’s maritime facilities and transit systems serve as leverage. ECOWAS could use that leverage as a catalyst for democratic transformation and regional integration.
A situation exists where the twelve coastal nations, exhibiting greater economic cohesion and demographic interdependence, and unburdened by the political influence of three suspended military regimes, may advance more swiftly and credibly on the economic integration initiative that has been the most enduring success of ECOWAS. A smaller, more cohesive membership does not ensure success, although it mitigates the coordinating challenge.
What does the future look like for ECOWAS?
ECOWAS remains actively engaged. The corridor for free movement, the framework for trade, and the institutional memory of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and The Gambia are tangible accomplishments that the beleaguered organisation continues to uphold.
The harm inflicted on ECOWAS is substantial but not inherently permanent, contingent upon the organisation undertaking significant reforms to restore its credibility with the populace, rather than solely with the regional governments.
The future of the regional bloc may take various paths – orchestrated insignificance, operational yet reduced impact, or revitalised significance. Its future direction shall be influenced more by the internal decisions of its remaining members than by external factors over the following two to three years.
The organisation that ended Liberia’s civil conflict, stabilised Sierra Leone, and facilitated Jammeh’s exit has the institutional knowledge and normative framework to be impactful once again. Again, the regional block’s future could be shaped by an implosion of AES. Notably, the AES junta governments are not stable.
They have not solved the security problems that justified their coups — jihadist territory has expanded under their watch and economic conditions in all three countries have deteriorated since departure. It could be a matter of time for the terms of re-engagement with ECOWAS to become live questions.
In conclusion, the future is not predetermined. Nevertheless, the timeframe for impactful reform is contracting, and the consequences of inaction intensify with every upcoming summit.
Samuel Koranteng Adjei (Executive Director)
THE NYANSA INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC DIALOGUE
The Nyansa Institute for Strategic Dialogue is a Ghanaian think tank dedicated to creating structured, evidence-based spaces for dialogue on governance, economic development, security, leadership, and regional integration.
Source: www.thenewindependentonline.com